Blog visitors outside philosophy (the discipline) will be forgiven if they haven't heard of the Philosophical Gourmet Report and/or Brian Leiter. Leiter is a professor at the University of Chicago, but that's neither here nor there really. I have read and do like some of his work. Leiter seems to be a belligerent kinda guy who sends nasty, over-the-top emails to people who criticise him.
He also publishes a gossip document (aka said Philosophical Gourmet Report) that ranks philosophy departments according to 'quality'. What determines quality? One would hope straightforward testable criteria such as publication records of faculty members, job placement and the like would be binding criteria to be used by evaluators. One would also assume that it's comprehensive and that it covers all doctoral degree granting philosophy programs. You could not be more mistaken. There's a pre-selection of 'top programs' which were somehow chosen, if you trust the Report's explanation of 'method'. It seems the Report picks faculty members from ranked programs and asks them to evaluate faculty lists. To take away the marketing effect of prestigious university labels the faculty lists do not include university affiliation. So, that would probably mean that if I received a list including Jeff McMahan I wouldn't think Oxford U. Fun approach that. Still, at least an effort is made to reduce bias based on institutional affiliation. That's kinda tricky as that is pretty much all that philosophers typically go by.
Well, what criteria are the evaluators given? They read like this: '"Faculty quality" should be taken to encompass the quality of philosophical work and talent represented by the faculty and the range of areas they cover, with the two weighted as you think appropriate. Since the rankings are used by prospective students, about to embark on a multi-year course of study, you may also take in to account, as you see fit, considerations like the status (full-time, part-time) of the faculty; the age of the faculty (as a somewhat tenuous guide to prospective availability, not quality); and the quality of training the faculty provide, to the extent you have information about this.'
Pretty obvious that this approach stays remarkably clear of measurable faculty outputs. Instead people affiliated with pre-selected programs evaluate the quality of people in pre-selected programs based on ... well, apparently, whatever criteria they choose to evaluate quality. Yep, that's how this works. This probably gels well with standard approaches of academic philosophers telling you that philosophy journals, usually old ones, that demonstrably nobody reads or cites, are top journals, simply because people from - you guessed it - top programs populate their editorial boards, and people from - you guessed it - top programs publish in them. Another sign of quality are typically inefficient review processes. The longer it takes the better it must be. Philosophical logic when it comes to evaluating philosophical quality is somewhat... well, unbeatable.
Anyhow, so that's this Report. Not once in my academic career did I bother looking it up. To be fair, it supposedly serves to assist in helping graduate students make sensible choices regarding graduate programs. Because it is used by lots of graduate students and apparently departments when they make hiring decisions, it has become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The beauty of academic philosophy. Never ceases to amaze me.
Well, Leiter also hosts a lively blog that I would probably be interested in if the above mentioned academic discipline and its shenanigans were of deep interest to me. There's on and off content posted there, often by Leiter himself, that's relevant to me (he does a bit of work that's of interest to secularists and academic freedom folks). I don't think I check-in more than once a month for a couple of minutes.
Anyhow, some philosophers think that Leiter is way too influential and ... well, a bully. So they try to have him removed from the PGR. A petition is circulating asking that folks sign it. Essentially it repeats that Leiter is a bully and that the signatories won't participate in reviewing for the PGR. Among the signatories are a whole bunch of very well-respected people, including personal friends of mine. I don't think I will sign the removal demand, because, frankly, the story is fairly convoluted and I can't quite make sense of it. Each side seems to represent a somewhat jaded (and incomplete) account of what it is that has transpired between the protagonists. Here's the Chronicle of Higher Education's take on the saga. Leiter doesn't seem to be a particular pleasant correspondent if he thinks you've crossed him, and some of his language is out of line by most standards. He does seem to do a decent job with the PGR, by philosophers' standards (whatever they might be). I suspect he might not be entirely mistaken if he assumes that the current kerfuffle is both sour grapes by programs not crowned by his philosophical gossip report as well as personal vendettas by folks he crossed in the past (and, no doubt, there will be legions by now).
Grab your popcorn, sit back and enjoy the latest philosophical fireworks, or, get a life.
Monday, September 29, 2014
Saturday, September 13, 2014
Great new review of 50 Great Myths About Atheism
From the current issues of the Journal of Contemporary Religion 2014; 29(3): 572-574.
50 Great Myths about Atheism
RUSSELL BLACKFORD & UDO SCHU¨ KLENK, 2013
Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell
274 pp., £50.00, US$84.95 (hb), £14.99, US$24.95 (pb)
ISBN 978–0–470–67404–8 (hb), ISBN 978–0–470–67405–5 (pb), ISBN 978–1–118–
60781–7 (eb)
In 50 Great Myths about Atheism, Russell Blackford, Conjoint Lecturer in the
School of Humanities and Social Science at the University of Newcastle,
Australia, and Udo Schu¨klenk, Professor of Philosophy at Queen’s University,
Canada, explore 50 ideas about atheists that they consider to be often
wrongfully upheld. The authors, who also wrote 50 Voices of Disbelief: Why We
Are Atheists, tackle each ‘myth’ in succession throughout the book, giving their
reasons for considering the notion invalid or at least unfair.
The material in the present volume is presented according to themes. After
an introductory chapter, in which the authors explain the structure of the book
and define the main concepts, myths are addressed related to (in sequential
order) the meaning of atheism, the style of living of atheists, ethics and the
soul of atheists, name calling, the unpleasantness of atheists, faith and reason,
religion and science, and the future of atheisms. For all the myths, the authors
typically first introduce the source of the myth and then offer a rebuttal of the
statement. The last chapter of the book, entitled “The Rise of Modern
Atheism”, covers a coherent discussion of the history of atheism as well as
arguments against some classic theistic lines of reasoning and arguments
against the notion that religion and science are compatible.
Blackford and Schu¨ klenk have done an admirable job in refuting the claims
they deem unjustly attributed to atheism. Overall, the authors’ arguments are
convincing and well supported by citations and examples. For instance, in the
case of myth 38, “Atheists Don’t Understand the Nature of Faith”, different
definitions of faith as advanced by various religious writers are cited and
discussed, after which the authors persuasively explain how none of these
definitions precludes atheists from understanding what faith means. Inevitably,
however, with so many different sub-sections, some myths are more
compellingly refuted than others. In the myth just mentioned, the philosophical
claim is supplemented by the empirical finding that, in the United States,
atheists generally know more about religion than those who self-identify as
religious. There are more sections where rational arguments are supplemented
by empirical data, for example, myth 17, “Atheists Fear Death (More than
Others)” and myth 22, “Atheists Don’t Give to Charity”. The book is
predominantly philosophical, however, so that no empirical data are provided
for many other myths. Understandably, data are in many cases not available
and in other cases not necessary. However, certain myths suggest demographic
and/or attitudinal claims about atheists and in these cases it is arguable that
the absence of empirical data renders the refutation somewhat less conclusive.
Assertions such as “Atheists See No Good in Religion” (myth 7) and “Atheists
Want to Strip People of their Beliefs” (myth 33) are refuted by Blackford and
Schu¨ klenk; they state, for example, that “atheists are not necessarily hostile to
all religion” (28) and that “there is nothing in the mere concept of atheism that
could justify the use of force or other forms of coercion as legitimate means of
transforming religious people into fellow atheists” (110). It remains a mystery,
however, to what extent the attitudes addressed by the myths are in reality
represented in the non-religious population. Logical arguments, in that sense,
can only provide part of the answer. In fact, it is not impossible that sometimes
philosophy and empiricism could provide different answers to the same
question. A clear example is myth 5, “Atheists Hate or are Angry with God”.
The authors propose that atheists cannot be angry be with God because they do
not believe that God exists. Philosophically, of course, this argument is solid.
Psychological research has shown, however, that people who self-identify as
atheists and agnostics can and do report anger towards God at times (Exline
et al.; Exline, Yali and Lobel). Whether those who report anger towards God
may be called atheists is a separate discussion and this does, of course, not
mean that the myth itself, namely that all (or most) atheists are angry with God,
is true. However, it does at least qualify the philosophical claim that atheists
cannot be angry with God.
Not all myths discussed in 50 Great Myths about Atheism are claims of
demographics or attitudes of atheists. In fact, many statements can be and are
well refuted, with the refutation based solely on philosophical arguments, such
as myth 20, “Without God there is no Morality”. Moreover, even in the
discussions that do leave space for empirical support, many interesting and
thought-provoking arguments are brought forward by the authors that should
trigger the reader to at least (re-)consider the truthfulness of the particular
claim about atheists. As the book is broken up into small sections, it is highly
accessible and allows readers to pick and choose the items they find most
interesting.
Overall, Blackford and Schu¨klenk’s work is a valuable contribution to the
debate between believers and non-believers. One hopes that the comics of
Jesus and Mo, which are dispersed throughout the book, in order, one
assumes, to amuse most non-religious readers, will not discourage religious
readers to pick up this book and consider the well debated ‘other side’ of
some of the beliefs about atheists they may hold.
SUZANNE BRINK
University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
© 2014 Suzanne Brink
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13537903.2014.945778
REFERENCES
Blackford, Russell, and Udo Schu¨klenk, eds. 50 Voices of Disbelief: Why We Are Atheists. Chichester,
West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009.
Exline, Julie J., Crystal L. Park, Joshua M. Smyth, and Michael P. Carey. “Anger toward God:
Social-cognitive Predictors, Prevalence, and Links with Adjustment to Bereavement and
Cancer.” Journal of Social and Personality Psychology 100 (2011): 129–48.
Exline, Julie J., Ann M. Yali, and Marci Lobel. “When God Disappoints: Difficulty Forgiving God
and its Role in Negative Emotion. Journal of Health Psychology 4 (1999): 365–79.
50 Great Myths about Atheism
RUSSELL BLACKFORD & UDO SCHU¨ KLENK, 2013
Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell
274 pp., £50.00, US$84.95 (hb), £14.99, US$24.95 (pb)
ISBN 978–0–470–67404–8 (hb), ISBN 978–0–470–67405–5 (pb), ISBN 978–1–118–
60781–7 (eb)
In 50 Great Myths about Atheism, Russell Blackford, Conjoint Lecturer in the
School of Humanities and Social Science at the University of Newcastle,
Australia, and Udo Schu¨klenk, Professor of Philosophy at Queen’s University,
Canada, explore 50 ideas about atheists that they consider to be often
wrongfully upheld. The authors, who also wrote 50 Voices of Disbelief: Why We
Are Atheists, tackle each ‘myth’ in succession throughout the book, giving their
reasons for considering the notion invalid or at least unfair.
The material in the present volume is presented according to themes. After
an introductory chapter, in which the authors explain the structure of the book
and define the main concepts, myths are addressed related to (in sequential
order) the meaning of atheism, the style of living of atheists, ethics and the
soul of atheists, name calling, the unpleasantness of atheists, faith and reason,
religion and science, and the future of atheisms. For all the myths, the authors
typically first introduce the source of the myth and then offer a rebuttal of the
statement. The last chapter of the book, entitled “The Rise of Modern
Atheism”, covers a coherent discussion of the history of atheism as well as
arguments against some classic theistic lines of reasoning and arguments
against the notion that religion and science are compatible.
Blackford and Schu¨ klenk have done an admirable job in refuting the claims
they deem unjustly attributed to atheism. Overall, the authors’ arguments are
convincing and well supported by citations and examples. For instance, in the
case of myth 38, “Atheists Don’t Understand the Nature of Faith”, different
definitions of faith as advanced by various religious writers are cited and
discussed, after which the authors persuasively explain how none of these
definitions precludes atheists from understanding what faith means. Inevitably,
however, with so many different sub-sections, some myths are more
compellingly refuted than others. In the myth just mentioned, the philosophical
claim is supplemented by the empirical finding that, in the United States,
atheists generally know more about religion than those who self-identify as
religious. There are more sections where rational arguments are supplemented
by empirical data, for example, myth 17, “Atheists Fear Death (More than
Others)” and myth 22, “Atheists Don’t Give to Charity”. The book is
predominantly philosophical, however, so that no empirical data are provided
for many other myths. Understandably, data are in many cases not available
and in other cases not necessary. However, certain myths suggest demographic
and/or attitudinal claims about atheists and in these cases it is arguable that
the absence of empirical data renders the refutation somewhat less conclusive.
Assertions such as “Atheists See No Good in Religion” (myth 7) and “Atheists
Want to Strip People of their Beliefs” (myth 33) are refuted by Blackford and
Schu¨ klenk; they state, for example, that “atheists are not necessarily hostile to
all religion” (28) and that “there is nothing in the mere concept of atheism that
could justify the use of force or other forms of coercion as legitimate means of
transforming religious people into fellow atheists” (110). It remains a mystery,
however, to what extent the attitudes addressed by the myths are in reality
represented in the non-religious population. Logical arguments, in that sense,
can only provide part of the answer. In fact, it is not impossible that sometimes
philosophy and empiricism could provide different answers to the same
question. A clear example is myth 5, “Atheists Hate or are Angry with God”.
The authors propose that atheists cannot be angry be with God because they do
not believe that God exists. Philosophically, of course, this argument is solid.
Psychological research has shown, however, that people who self-identify as
atheists and agnostics can and do report anger towards God at times (Exline
et al.; Exline, Yali and Lobel). Whether those who report anger towards God
may be called atheists is a separate discussion and this does, of course, not
mean that the myth itself, namely that all (or most) atheists are angry with God,
is true. However, it does at least qualify the philosophical claim that atheists
cannot be angry with God.
Not all myths discussed in 50 Great Myths about Atheism are claims of
demographics or attitudes of atheists. In fact, many statements can be and are
well refuted, with the refutation based solely on philosophical arguments, such
as myth 20, “Without God there is no Morality”. Moreover, even in the
discussions that do leave space for empirical support, many interesting and
thought-provoking arguments are brought forward by the authors that should
trigger the reader to at least (re-)consider the truthfulness of the particular
claim about atheists. As the book is broken up into small sections, it is highly
accessible and allows readers to pick and choose the items they find most
interesting.
Overall, Blackford and Schu¨klenk’s work is a valuable contribution to the
debate between believers and non-believers. One hopes that the comics of
Jesus and Mo, which are dispersed throughout the book, in order, one
assumes, to amuse most non-religious readers, will not discourage religious
readers to pick up this book and consider the well debated ‘other side’ of
some of the beliefs about atheists they may hold.
SUZANNE BRINK
University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
© 2014 Suzanne Brink
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13537903.2014.945778
REFERENCES
Blackford, Russell, and Udo Schu¨klenk, eds. 50 Voices of Disbelief: Why We Are Atheists. Chichester,
West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009.
Exline, Julie J., Crystal L. Park, Joshua M. Smyth, and Michael P. Carey. “Anger toward God:
Social-cognitive Predictors, Prevalence, and Links with Adjustment to Bereavement and
Cancer.” Journal of Social and Personality Psychology 100 (2011): 129–48.
Exline, Julie J., Ann M. Yali, and Marci Lobel. “When God Disappoints: Difficulty Forgiving God
and its Role in Negative Emotion. Journal of Health Psychology 4 (1999): 365–79.
Friday, September 12, 2014
Endless fraud of fee-for-up-load Open Access 'publishing'
So, for your enjoyment, here's the latest instalment of the fee-for-upload 'open access' publishing industry. I received this just now. Make sure to read beyond the invitation-to-submit reproduced below. It gets more interesting.
"Dear Dr. Udo Schüklenk,
Greetings from the Journal Palliative Medicine and Nursing: Open Access (PMNOA).
We would like to introduce Aperito Online Publishing which is dedicated to the scientific community. Our motto is to provide the easily accessible research information worldwide.
For this we have chosen the selective scientists who have enormously contributed to the scientific community to have their work published in our Journal. You are requested to send any type of articles (Research; Review; Case Report; Mini Review; Short communication; Opinion; Letter to Editors, etc) to the Journal to increase the visibility of our Journal.
You can submit your article by sending an email to mailto:editor.pmnoa@
Note: If required we can also extend the date of submission as per your convenience.
You are requested to send an email for the confirmation within 48 hrs.
Best Regards
Sophia Elena
Aperito Online Publishing
1999 S. Bascom Avenue,
Suite 700, Campbell, California, 95008
USA
So, I'm selective scientist (I'm not a scientist, I'm a philosopher), and if I submit before September 27 (!!!) I will get my up-load (aka Open Access fee) reduced (aka waived) by 50%. The motto of this fee-for-upload publication is 'easily accessible research information worldwide'. Cool. Why should I bother? Right, the journal wants my fee-for-upload 'publication', so that it can increase its own 'visibility'. Gotcha.
Remarkably, this SPAM outfit boasts two University of Toronto academics on its Editorial Board. I wonder whether they are aware of the nature of the publication that they're listed on the Editorial Board on: Peter C Coyte, Vincent Maida. Other academics are listed without the academic institution even being mentioned. The usual. A hastily copy-pasted-together 'journal' website aiming to get suckers to send their articles and credit card details… Why do academics support these kinds of outfits - well, do they? I'm not so sure even about that. Oh, in case you want to know where this prestigious academic journal is supposedly or really physically located, this is what a quick address search offers, an insurance broker, probably fully unaware of the fact that they're sharing an office address with this prestigious Open Access journal. Ein Schelm war bosses dabei dent.
Oh, and in case you wonder, of course there are academics that fall for such fraudsters, as this 'publication' in one of its journals demonstrates.
"Dear Dr. Udo Schüklenk,
Greetings from the Journal Palliative Medicine and Nursing: Open Access (PMNOA).
We would like to introduce Aperito Online Publishing which is dedicated to the scientific community. Our motto is to provide the easily accessible research information worldwide.
For this we have chosen the selective scientists who have enormously contributed to the scientific community to have their work published in our Journal. You are requested to send any type of articles (Research; Review; Case Report; Mini Review; Short communication; Opinion; Letter to Editors, etc) to the Journal to increase the visibility of our Journal.
You can submit your article by sending an email to mailto:editor.pmnoa@
| Country Type | Research/Review Articles | Case Reports | Mini Review/Letters to Editors | Short Communications |
| High Income | $909 | $549 | $500 | $400 |
| Middle Income | $729 | $459 | $400 | $300 |
| Low Income | $549 | $369 | $360 | $200 |
Note: If required we can also extend the date of submission as per your convenience.
You are requested to send an email for the confirmation within 48 hrs.
Best Regards
Sophia Elena
Aperito Online Publishing
1999 S. Bascom Avenue,
Suite 700, Campbell, California, 95008
USA
So, I'm selective scientist (I'm not a scientist, I'm a philosopher), and if I submit before September 27 (!!!) I will get my up-load (aka Open Access fee) reduced (aka waived) by 50%. The motto of this fee-for-upload publication is 'easily accessible research information worldwide'. Cool. Why should I bother? Right, the journal wants my fee-for-upload 'publication', so that it can increase its own 'visibility'. Gotcha.
Remarkably, this SPAM outfit boasts two University of Toronto academics on its Editorial Board. I wonder whether they are aware of the nature of the publication that they're listed on the Editorial Board on: Peter C Coyte, Vincent Maida. Other academics are listed without the academic institution even being mentioned. The usual. A hastily copy-pasted-together 'journal' website aiming to get suckers to send their articles and credit card details… Why do academics support these kinds of outfits - well, do they? I'm not so sure even about that. Oh, in case you want to know where this prestigious academic journal is supposedly or really physically located, this is what a quick address search offers, an insurance broker, probably fully unaware of the fact that they're sharing an office address with this prestigious Open Access journal. Ein Schelm war bosses dabei dent.
Oh, and in case you wonder, of course there are academics that fall for such fraudsters, as this 'publication' in one of its journals demonstrates.
Monday, September 08, 2014
Bioethics and the Ebola Crisis
As I write this the global north’s media
hype about the Ebola outbreak in various West African nations is at its peak. Amidst
wild speculations about the number of infected people there are also confirmed facts,
such as about 3700 confirmed cases and about 1800 deaths.[1]
No doubt numbers will increase. These cases occurred overwhelmingly in Liberia,
Sierra Leone, Guinea and most recently Nigeria. It goes without saying that many
more people have died of other preventable or treatable diseases in that same
period of time in those same countries, yet the world’s gaze was transfixed on
Ebola. Just for a reality check, in Nigeria about 215.000 people die per year
entirely preventable deaths related to HIV/AIDS and another 300.000 die of
Malaria.[2]
Having said that, Ebola is a pretty terrible disease, even by the usual
unpleasant standards of life-threatening diseases.
As can be expected of some mysterious
disease emanating from the ‘dark continent’, a lot of attention seeking theatre
accompanies the deadly performance of the actual virus. The actors are a mixed
bunch of Christian missionaries busily trying to get their hands on the last
available experimental agents while on private medical jet flights out of West
Africa. As you would expect, toward the end of their performance they thanked
their respective gods for their survival as opposed to state of the art medical
care. Who else performed in the mass media’s bright lights? International
organisations tried to grab the limelight. There were serious performers such
as Doctors without Borders. They have treated patients in Ebola outbreaks for
many years, without ever losing personnel in the process. Doctors without
Borders provided us with sensible explanations for the ‘why now’ of the outbreak
and the ‘why here’ with regard to where the outbreak is occurring. Essentially
the outbreak is occurring in failing states with barely existing health care
systems. Patients and their families – often with good reason – do not trust
foreign or local medical staff. Quite understandably they are suspicious
because mostly body bags leave government and other facilities tasked with
attending to Ebola patients. Many of these people also don’t quite buy into the
idea of viral causes of disease. Doctors without Borders asked for urgently
needed specialist personnel from countries of the global north, staff able to
undertake the necessary laboratory work, health care personnel for treatment, portable
medical equipment necessary to isolate patients, and so on and so forth. That,
of course, is so obvious, that it’s nearly boring. Theatre must be
entertaining, and Doctors without Borders isn’t quite delivering on that front.
Steps in the WHO. After missing the
outbreak for a fairly extensive period of time the world organisation
responsible for global health decided that its first act after declaring this
outbreak a pandemic, should be to host an expert meeting on experimental
treatments and experimental preventative vaccines. It goes without saying that
this haphazard meeting, convened within a week by WHO, and not really staffed
by people who are experts on access to experimental agents, provided the
necessary entertainment required by the media circuit. Endless media interviews
were scheduled on the ethics of access to experimental agents all throughout
August 2014, and it is here where the stage opened – finally – for
bioethicists.
How did we perform? Did we stress that
WHO’s choice of topic and the supposed urgency of its recommendation to provide
access to experimental agents in Ebola regions amounted to pointless
grandstanding in the face of a pandemic that requires a public health response,
and not the tinkering with experimental agents? Some of us did, but it didn’t
stop most of us from entertaining questions on the ethics of who should get
experimental agents, whether it was ok that white religious activists with a
health care background were prioritized over local dying health workers, and
other reportedly important questions. In the rush to be seen to do something the WHO managed to convene
said meeting without a single representative from a country affected directly
by Ebola.
None of that mattered on the main stage of
a pandemic veering out of control. Predictably riots broke out, patients ran
away from hospitals or were violently freed out of isolation units by their
worried families. Such on the ground mayhem would have also made for reasonably
nice media theatre, alas, bioethicists decided to bring the full armament of
analytical ethics to bear on crucial questions such as who should receive an
experimental vaccine first. It is not that they were wrong in their concerns
about the fact that these vaccines aren’t quite vaccines, they are chemicals
that prevented infections in some monkeys. Even the drugs’ toxicity profiles
were not established. So, in fairness there were ethical issues, but they were
not the most pressing ethical issues. They were not particularly pressing
because these vaccine candidates, even if they turned out to work, would not
make a dent in the current pandemic. Did these issues occupy most of the mass
media – bioethics collaborative performances? Sadly they did.
In supporting roles appeared health care
professionals assembled by various nations, tasked with providing health care
and laboratory services. They were doing the kind of work that Doctors without
Borders has successfully undertaken for many years. Turns out our supporting
actors are at the time of writing not quite ready for prime time, so as quickly
as they drop in to West Africa, they are being airlifted due to some real or
imaginary risk to them. The obvious point to be made here is perhaps this:
Don’t send staff not up to the task, because the endless kerosene burned in
private medical jets flying them forth and back is using up resources that
could probably be put to better use. For instance, it could be used toward a
down-payment for the creation of functioning primary care health care systems
in the countries in question. Turns out, this allocation decision is an ethical
decision, alas one not addressed by anyone currently pontificating on Ebola
ethics.
What then are other relevant ethical
questions to be addressed in the context of this pandemic? Here are a few that
come to mind: What are the ethical obligations of citizens (and their
representative governments) in the global north toward those affected now by
this pandemic? Should they send health care personnel, possibly even military
personnel, as the US President suggested in an interview? Or would it be sufficient
to send a couple of experimental agents and wash their hands of the pandemic,
as Canadian bioethicist Peter A. Singer seems to suggest in an interview. [3]
Assuming that military or police force could assist in curbing the spread of
the pandemic, under what circumstances and within which parameters should such
deployments occur? What obligations of care do agencies have toward their
staff? Do specialist technical public health workers in the global north have
professional responsibilities to participate in Ebola related missions, given
that they didn’t quite sign on for that sort of risk when they joined
governmental agencies in the UK, Australia, Japan or elsewhere. What personal
risks – if any – can they reasonably be expected to accept for themselves, both
in terms of infection risk, but also in terms of violence that could occur if
the local situation spins further out of control. Given that the existing
health care infrastructure in the affected countries is disintegrating in front
of our eyes, should others consider stepping in to provide the basic health services
the local system was able to provide until – however insufficiently - the Ebola
crisis hit?
There you go bioethics. Think of Ebola as
primarily a public health challenge not a research ethics phenomenon and you
might just be addressing questions that actually matter, ethically.
Udo Schuklenk
[1] Centers for Disease Control (U.S.). 2014. 2014 Ebola Outbreak in
West Africa. http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/guinea/
(Accessed September 8, 2014)
[2] United States Embassy in Nigeria. Nigeria Malaria Fact Sheet. http://photos.state.gov/libraries/nigeria/231771/Public/December-MalariaFactSheet2.pdf
[3] Hildebrandt, Amber. 2014. Why Canada must approach the Ebola
outbreak as a natural disaster. CBC News Sept. 05. http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/why-canada-must-approach-ebola-outbreak-like-a-natural-disaster-1.2754828
[Accessed September 8, 2014]
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